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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(j). This matter has been assigned to the Court of Appeals 
from the Utah Supreme Court. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. Issue: Does a UCC filing which gives notice that a horse is 
collateral for an existing loan provide constructive notice, which precludes a party who 
failed to search the UCC records from asserting a claim for fraud (ie. reasonable reliance) 
based upon a claim that the defendants misrepresented to them that the horse was 
unencumbered? 
Determinative law: 
J.R. Simplot Company, ef al„ v. Sales King International^ al.„ 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 
2000) 
Maack v. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
Robinson et aL, v. Tripco, et al., 21 P.3d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
Standard of review: The review of the court's legal conclusions is for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah 
Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265. (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
b. Issue: Are Plaintiffs precluded from asserting fraud 
who underwent an investigation of whether the horse was the subject of a lien or 
collateral for an existing loan, however, as part of their investigation failed to search UCC 
filings? 
Determinative law: 
J.R. Simplot Company, et ah, v. Sales King International^ ah, 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 
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2000) 
Maack v. Resource Design & Const, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
Robinson et al.. v. Tripco, et al., 21 P.3d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
Standard of review: The review of the court's legal conclusions is for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah 
Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265, (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
c. Issue: Have the Plaintiffs met their burden of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence when at the closing Thomas Keetch, Rebecca Mendenhall 
and Janice Timothy all testified that the issue of liens and collateral was not discussed at 
all yet in the Court's finding, the Court found both Janice Timothy and Paul Timothy to 
be credible witnesses, yet their testimony is contrary to each other on the vary issue of 
fraud? 
Determinative law: 
J.R. Simplot Company, et al., v. Sales King International^ al., 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 
2000) 
Maack v. Resoiirce Design & Const, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
Robinson et al., v. Tripco, et al., 21 P.3d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
Standard of review: The review of the court's legal conclusions is for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah 
Div. Of State Lands & Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265, (Utah Ct. App. 1994); In the context 
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of whether plaintiff has met the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence the 
court will assess the quality and quantity of the evidence to determine whether it clearly 
preponderates against the trial courts determination that the appropriate standard of proof 
has been satisfied. Nikols v. Goodman & Chesnoff, 626 Utah Adv. Rep. 14. The 
standard for clear and convincing evidence is that there is no serious or substantial doubt 
as to the correctness of the conclusion. Nikols v. Goodman & Chesnoff, 626 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14 
e. Issue: Are Petitioners attorney's fee reasonable when counsel 
for Petitioner charges an hourly rate through much of the litigation and then converts the 
balance of his services to a contingent fee basis and further when the Court rules on 
attorney's fees relating to specific motions during the pendency of the litigation are those 
interim orders regarding fees res judicata or may the Petitioner then claim fees for all of 
the litigation without respect to interim orders? 
Determinative law: 
Kealamakia, Inc. v. Nadine Kealamakia et al„ 2009 UT App. 148 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009) 
Standard of review: The standard of review is an abuse of discretion 
standard. Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract and fraud action having been commenced in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court by the filing of the Complaint by Paul and Janice Timothy on 
January 79 2002. (R:04) 
On July 31, 2002, an Annulled Cumpl nnf was filed alleging breach of contract 
and fraud. (II: 961 1 <>m ami Teri Keetch filed bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy 
• *• virict of Arizona bearing bankruptcy no. 2:07-bk-02532-SM.. i ne •. ni-ci; M.:.. 
Bankruptcy Court, discharged the contract claims, how cvei .illpw.nl flic matter to go 
forward in the Fourth Judicial 1 >rui set * 'ourl <-n the issues of fraud. The issues were 
!va:i- hcl.^vi;»t ««:«orable Claudia Laycock at a Bench Trial held on the 8, 9 and 13th 
•\)\ of January, 2009. (R: ) Judge Claudia Laycock ruled from the bench iit tlu 
conclusion of the Trial (T: 34 - s - page 5o » i m - •. n I:JM •> *'!- !; hidings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law . * )rdci ami Imminent on May 6. 2009. (R:1027) The Court entered 
afnii. - w k - ^ he issue of attorney's fees on July 20, 2009. (R:1051) 
Notice of Appeal and B ond on Appeal were fil ed iiI u \ e i - u. i .. i. . •*;. • .,: ; w i 
August 19, 2009. (R:1056) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs contend that the Keetches fraudulently induced them into lending 
money on a bridge loan. Plaintiffs claims for fraud are contains m .-. ^nd^
 ;: •nwr-n^i 
of the Amended Complaint. Plaintills alleyc in p(ii";igraph 13: 
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On or before September 28. 200 L Defendants made certain false 
representations to the Plaintiffs as hereinafter set forth: 
a. That the Keetches would pledge to the Plaintiffs 
the horse called *TIesa Son of a Dun'' as collateral for the 
aforementioned loan: and 
b. That the Keetches would use all of the monies 
received from the loan to purchase additional horses; and 
c. That Hesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of 
all liens and encumbrances and could be used by the 
Defendants as collateral for the aforementioned loan. (R: 95, 
96.) 
Judge Laycock specifically ruled that the basis for Plaintiffs claim for fraud were 
limited to the isssues raised in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint subparagraphs a, 
b, and c. The Court ruled: 
The statute — I'm sorry - the rule, in the rule of civil 
procedure, allows notice pleading, which means you can generally put 
the other side on notice as to what the claims are except for fraud 
which has to be plead with particularity, as has been noted by both 
parties here in their arguments. And I think what that means is that to 
at trial marshal all the evidence that you can about anything that 
might have been fraudulently said is an unfair attack by the plaintiff, 
because the requirement is that the statements be pleaded with 
particularity so the other side does have notice. 
And so I think the plaintiffs case, is limited to the three claims that 
are made under 13, paragraph 13 in the amended complaint. So I agree. I 
sustain the objection. (T:57:13 - 58:1.) 
The Court again narrowed the scope of the fraud claim in its Ruling wherein the 
Court stated as follows: 
All right, thank you, counsel, for your arguments. Vm 
just going to address the fraud claim, since we have taken care 
of the contract claim. The amended complaint, which is the 
complaint on which we go forward today, in its first claim for 
relief says in paragraph 13: "On or before September 28, 
8 
2001, Defendants made certain false representations to the 
Plaintiffs as hereafter set forth, a) that the Keetches would 
pledge to Plaintiffs the horse called Hesa Son of a Dun as 
collateral for the aforementioned loan; and, b) that the 
Keetches would use all the monies received fromthe loan to 
purchase additional horses; and, c) that Hesa Son of a Dun 
was free and clear of all liens and encumbrances and could be 
used by the Defendants as collateral for the aforementioned 
loan. 
1 view part ol (a) as part of a subpart of (b) and (c ). Certainly, they 
did pledge the horse called Hesa Son of a Dun as collateral for the 
aforementioned loan. But I don't think that's what at issue. What is really 
at issue is (b) and ( c ). I find that these two parts were pled with 
particularity as required by the Utah Code of Civil Procedure. 
The facts from both sides don't support that the Keetches promised 
that they would use all the monies received from the loan to purchase 
additional horses. The testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Timothy was they were 
going to save their herd of mares, and the testimony frbm the Keetches is 
that they didn't make any promises as to how they were going to spend the 
money. I find that that particular representation as claimed in the first claim 
for relief has not been carried by a preponderance of the evidence. 
As to c), that Hesa a Son of a Dun is free of all liens and 
encumbrances and could be used by the defendants as collateral for the 
aforementioned loan, that is the crux of all of this. (T:;>44:21 - 546:3) 
Plain! i IV allege in paragraph 10 of their amended complaint; 
At the time the Keetches purported to use "Hesa Son of a Dun" as 
collateral for the loan, the horse had already been pledged as collateral to 
secure another loan from a third party, and was subject to a UCC financing 
statement, which made it impossible and fraudulent for the Keetches to 
pledge "Hesa Son of a Dun" as collateral for the loan from the plaintiffs. 
(R:95) 
In short, the Plaintiffs acknowledge the UCC filing ajnd are limited to a singk 
claim of fraud, ie that Hesa a Son of a Dun is free ol all liens and em iiinhrances and 
could be used by the defendants as coP-tie1 «l -^ ;• c aforementioned loan. 
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The bridge loan from the plaintiff came about as follows: The Defendants 
Tom and Teri Keetch had an interest in establishing a therapeutic horse ranch. (T: 
437:1 8-21) Initially the Defendants went to Kevin Wright in an effort to secure financing. 
(T: 437:22-24) Kevin Wright had been a loan officer for many years and in fact had been 
a previous employer of Teri Keetch. (T:438:l-6) 
The Keetches did not have enough independent financial backing and it became 
apparent that they would need partners to join with them inasmuch as this would be 
considered a jumbo loan. (T:438:15-19) It was the intent of the Keetches that the 
therapeutic ranch would have two components: a) a non profit side which would be the 
therapeutic horse riding ranch side and in addition would have a profitable side which 
would include the breeding and training of horses which could be sold or used to supply 
the horses needed in the therapeutic nonprofit side. (T:l 12:18-23). 
In furtherance of the Defendants efforts they purchased a stallion for breeding 
purposes named Hesa Son of a Dun. (T:43 8:20-22) As part of the acquisition of Hesa 
Son of a Dun, the Keetches had to borrow money for the purchase in the amount of 
$102,000.00 which was borrowed from Travis Wright (Travis Wright is unrelated to 
Kevin Wright). (T:439:l-8) In order to establish the therapeutic ranch, it was necessary 
that the Keetches find funding in a sufficient amount to purchase the real property; 
purchase horses, pay the debt on Hesa Son of a Dunn and to provide enough working 
capital to run the operation until such time as the ranch generated enough money to 
10 
sustain itself (T:440:13-441:1) 
Kevin VVnghl. icquiivd certain information from the Keetches in preparation for his 
help in finding lenders. Kevin Wright obtained credit reports on the Keetches; he had the 
Keetches put together projections for the therapeutic easiness; he rc\j«.i -. n : M«.e 
license for the nonprofit organizatioti, , i. • • * ; 9) 
As a p.nl of the transaclimi related to the purchase of Hesa Son of a Dun, a security 
interest, was perfected which included the filing with the I JCC. (R:^^ Sc\ *• • ) 
The Defendants made Kevin Wright aware of the UCC tiling and the dm against 
Hesa Son <•: ,i i h\\. • i • •. • - • v * »- ^ -:• v right was unable to find a lender 
wil ••- < :: c. •• n •* aiid referred the Defendants to Becky Mendenhall to try and 
broker a loan. As part of the transition between Kevin Wright and Hca,: AI. : IU. ..n.i.l, 
there occurred a conference call in the presence <: ,**•.* .-• •• l • who was in 
the office with Kevin Wnglit when he spoke ^ ilh Becky Mendenhall. (T:442:9-22) 
As part of that eonference call, Kevin Wright explained to Becky Mendenhall that 
Hesa Son of a Dun had a note with Travis Wright and that Hesa Son oi - ; '..i: ^ >•  
collateral for the 1. .-n. (T:443:4-l 2) 
Defendant Teri Keetch •• ^..;: • • *\ e-satir.ii particularly because Becky 
Menderr ^ : ' \ i id vis Wright (i.e. the lender on Hesa Son of a Dun). Travis Wright 
and Becky Mendenhall had previously worked together and were neigh hi >i> ('I 4 H " 
12) 
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Teri Keetch physically took the file of Kevin Wright and delivered it to Becky 
Mendenhall (T:443:24- 444:1). Teri Keetch saw the UCC filing securing the interest on 
Hesa Son of a Dun in the file delivered to Becky Mendenhall. (T:444:22-25) (Becky 
Mendenhall denied that she was ever made aware of the UCC filing on Hesa Son of a 
Dun). 
While the Keetches were working with Kevin Wright, they Googled from the 
internet "Hesa Son of a Dun" which gave information about the horse including the link 
to the UCC filing. (T:441:18-21) The UCC documents were part of the file given to 
Becky Mendenhall and further the payoff for Hesa Son of a Dun was a part of the 
projections needed in arriving at a final figure that would need to be borrowed. (T:441:6-
15) Just shortly before the parties entered into the bridge loan which gives rise to the 
present litigation, Becky Mendenhall called the Keetches and informed them that she had 
found someone to be a part of the nonprofit organization, that it had been a dream of his 
for years and that he had found a really nice property in Park City that she wanted the 
Keetches to see. (T:446:l-9) 
Teri Keetch took along her realtor Debbie Blatt and met with Becky Mendenhall's 
investor to look at the real property in Park City. (T:446:l-9) 
Debbie Blatt testified at Trial and stated that at the meeting with Becky 
Mendenhall's investor that Teri Keetch disclosed to him that the Keetches did not have 
the credit to be able to borrow money sufficient to purchase the real property and as part 
12 
of that same conversation disclosed to the investor that Hesa Son of a Dun would need to 
be paid for as part of the final loan. (T:239:16-20) 
Teri Keetch testified at Trial as follows: 
Q: All right. Did Becky ever make representations to you prior to the 
Timothys hearing as to whether or not a loan had been approved and 
what the status of the loan was? 
A: Yes. She had made representations to myself and to Ms. Blatt and to Phil, 
all of us, to go ahead and sign the Purchase Agreement, we have got a loan 
in place. 
Q: It was just a matter of closing? 
A: Yes. 
(T:446:16-23) 
Becky Mendenhall made similar representations to Paul Timothy. Paul Timothy 
testified as follows: 
Q: What documents did you see at Becky's office? 
A: I can't remember exactly. As I recall, they were the closing 
papers. 
Q: What did Becky represent to you as to the status of the closing 
of that loan? 
A: She said it would happen within 30 days to three months 
probably the shorter period of time. 
(T:422:12-16) 
Because of the amount of time it had taken to find a lender the Keetches were 
financially strapped in meeting their own personal needs, however, believed that based 
upon the representations of Becky Mendenhall that a closing would take place shortly on 
the long term financing. (T:446:16-23) Becky Mendenhall proposed to the Keetches that 
she had a lender (the plaintiffs Paul and Janice Timothy) that would loan money by way 
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of a bridge loan to the Keetches until a closing on the permanent financing could be 
closed. The Keetches believed that because the}' had employed a broker, that it was 
improper for them to deal directly with the Timothys who were Becky's client. In that 
regard. Ten Keetch testified in response to Plaintiffs counsel's questions as follows: 
Q: Did you disclose to Paul Timothy that you were - that you 
owed money to MSF Properties, and that you had secured that 
loan with Hesa Son of a Dun? 
A: No. We were using a broker so it is not really customary for 
the person getting the loan to speak directly with the lender 
and I was actually just doing Becky a favor. Becky had called 
me and said that she couldn't take him up to see the horse, 
because she had an appointment, and so could I. 
Q: So the answer is "No" that you did not disclose that to Paul 
Timothy? 
A: Not to Paul Timothy, but to Becky. 
Q: Your testimony is that you told that to Becky? 
A: Correct. 
Q: When did you tell that to Becky? 
A: She knew that from the first day I met her. Our entire 
situation about the horses being collateralized, about our 
credit issues. 
(T:118:22-119:13) 
Teri Keetch only had one contact with plaintiffs and that single contact was only 
with Paul Timothy. Teri Keetch testified: 
Q. All right. Let me take you to the events with the Timothys. Is it 
true that the only contact that you had prior to the signing of this loan, the 
bridge loan, was at the McDonald's and subsequent travel to Jake Stevens'? 
A. We only spoke at McDonald's. The only communication we had at 
Jake's was me introducing them. 1 had to leave to pick up my kids from 
school. So I actually didn't have that variance to say, okay, this is so 
important 1 will just blow off work. It was to pick my kids up from school. 
I had to be there. 
Q. All Right. Let me make sure we arc all on the same page. There 
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was only one occasion in which you met with in which you met with either 
Janice or Paul Timothy prior to this promissory note being signed? 
A. I never met Janice. Paul, I only met for five, ten minutes at 
McDonald's. 
Q. What was the purpose of your meeting with Paul Timothy? 
A. Becky had called me and said that Mr. Timothy wanted to see the 
stallion, and could 1 meet him and take him over to the stallion? And I 
said, no, I couldn't in an hour I needed to be to my children's school to pick 
them up. And sher said, He just just wants to to meet you right at 
McDonald's, at the entry. Its real close to there. I can't do it. She told me 
she had another obligation that she couldn't do it, and that he had to do it 
then. And I said, well, as long as he understands I, can't set and talk, 
because it is from Sandy to Lehi already it was going to eat up round trip 
40, 45, 50 minutes. So I literally only had five, ten minutes to talk with 
him. (T:449:15-450:18). 
When Teri Keetch was asked what was said in the meeting she testified: 
Q. Can you describe for me what occurred at the meeting? 
A. Yes. I walked into McDonald's, and I was holding my baby, and 
saw a gentleman near the counter on his cell phone, and I looked around, 
and I didn't see anyone else, and I so I just waited for him to get off the 
phone, and he was a good, long time, and so I was pretty frustrated by that 
point, because I am watching my watch as well. 
And he finally hung up, and said. Are you Teri? And I said, Yes. You 
must be Paul. And he said, Yeah. I have a couple questions. Can you sit 
down? And I let him know then, I said, I really can't. I've got to get going. 
I've got pick up my kids. And he said, Well, I just have a couple questions. 
And he briefly asked about the nonprofit organization.; 
And then he asked me, So, now how do you intend to pay the loan 
back? And then stopped himself and he said, Oh, that's right, Becky told 
me she is doing the end loan. And I said, Yes, that's right, we are paying it 
back in the end loan. 
And then he asked me, Can you take me to see the Stallion? And I 
said, Well, actually, since I'm in such a hurry. And he said, Oh, that's fine, 
yeah, I can follow you. So we walked out. I was parked right up front, 
right against the doors. I walked to my car. As I recall, he was parked 
across the parking lot in that row. So he said, Oh, this is your car? And I 
said yes. And he said, Okay I will follow you. So we followed, pulled up 
to Jake's, got out of the car, Jake was putting away a horse. I said, Hey, 
15 
Jake. He waved. I ran up-
Q. Keep going. Tell me what happened in the conversation. 
A. I ran up. I said. Jake this is Paul. He's the one that's doing the 
bridge loan for us on He's a Son of a Dun. Paul this is Jake. He the trainer. 
They said, Oh nice to meet you, shook hands. And 1 said. Could you get 
He's a Son of a Dun out for him? And he said. Oh, yeah no problem. I can 
do that. In fact, I have a video right here from our last show. Would you 
like to see a video? And Paul said, Yeah, that would be great. I would love 
to see him in action. And I left. 
Q. In Beck's conversations with you as to the purpose of this meeting, 
did she ever tell you, you need to go down and negotiate this deal with Mr. 
Timothy? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever have any involvement directly with Mr. Timothy as to 
the amount of the loan, how the payments would be made, what the interest 
rate would be, what the loan origination fees would be? 
A. No. 
Q. How was that negotiated? 
A. Actually, I choked when I saw the promissory note at closing. That's 
the first time I had seen what the terms were. But Becky assured me that 
she did these kinds of loans all the time, and that's what they expect, and 
that it wouldn't be a big deal because it is coming out of the end loan and 
it's all there. She arranged for it all to be there. (T:451:5-453:10) 
Mr. Timothy testifies as follows as it related to his only contact with Teri Keetch. 
Q. Okay. And so did you go ahead and have a meeting? 
A. We did. 
Q. And how long did that meeting last? 
A. You know, I didn't time it, but it had to be 45 
'minutes to an hour plus. 
Q. And what did you discuss with Teri Keetch at that 
A. She indicated she needed $83,500.1 felt that was 'kind of an odd 
sum. So I asked her why she needed that exact ,amount. 
Q. What did she tell you? 
A. She indicated that's the amount she needed to "save 
her herd." 
16 
Q. Okay. And did she give you more in formation1 on that? 
A. You mean what the herd was? 
Q. Detailed about why she needed that money lb save the herd? 
A. Apparently, she had a loan on the mares, and she -
she needed to pay off that loan or she would lose the mares. 
Q. Okay. Did she tell you anything else about why she 
needed the money? 
A. No. 
Q. Did she tell you what she intended to use that money 
for? 
A. She Said she needed that exact amount to s^ve the herd. 
Q. Okay. Now, did you discuss anything else at that meeting 
A. Yes, we did. I asked her what collateral she|would 
have to put up for the herd, and she indicated she had a 
stallion by the name of He's a Son of a Dun, ancf that the 
stallion was worth considerably more than what we were 
borrowing. 
Q. Did she tell You whether she owned that stallion? 
A. She did. 
Q. And what did she say? 
A. She said the — she and her husband Tom owned the 
stallion free and clear. 
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Q. Did she specifically use those words "free and clear" 
or was it words to that effect? 
A. I can't remember. You know, it has been seven years. 
1 don't know if it was "free 'and clear." 
Q. Did you specifically ask her if she had -
A. Yes. as a follow-up question I said, Is the stallion 
encumbered in any way? And she said no. I asked her if the 
stallion was fully paid off. And she said he was. 
Q. Okay. What else did you discuss at that meeting? 
A. I asked her, once again, if the stallion was encumbered. I 
also asked her if she had ever declared bankruptcy, and she told 
me she had not. I said, Have you or your husband or together 
have you ever declared bankruptcy? And she indicated that she 
had never done that. 
Q. Do you remember discussing anything else at that 
meeting? 
A. She indicated to me that the stallion was a show 
horse, and that they would like to be able to take him to 
shows. And I declined that. I said as long as we have the 
loan in place we want him to remain where he is at the present 
time. 
We also talked about the possibility of bringing the 
stallion to my stables. And that was left open until I saw 
where he was and what the conditions were at the stable that he 
was currently at. 
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Q. Did she talk to you about the value of He's a Son of 
a Dun? 
A. Yeah. She told me he was worth somewhere between 125 
and 150,000. 
Q. Okay. Did you talk about anything else that you want 
to bring up at this time at that meeting? 
A. I asked her how she intended on paying the loan back. 
She said she had a loan in place that would be — that wcjmld 
consummate within 30 days to three months, and that she had a 
backup to that if that loan didn't go through, but the loan was — 
had been approved, and that they should have no problqm 
with that. 
I asked her if the - if the stallion was used for 
collateral, if she would have any trouble with us picking that 
stallion up immediately, and she said, no, there would oe no 
problem, that there is no way that I would let that stallion 
go, because that is our business. He is our business. 
Q. Now, after that meeting did you do anything to 
investigate whether or not you should do that loan? (T:376:3-
379:9) 
The only other meeting involving the parties occurred at) closing and 
involved Thomas Keetch, Paul Timothy, Janice Timothy and JBecky 
Mendenhall. Paul Timothy testified: 
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Q. All right. I think you said then you went to a 
meeting with Beck)' and Tom. That was a closing? 
A. That was at the closing. 
Q. Do you remember when that was? 
A. September 28th. 2001. 
Q. Okay. And did you talk to Tom at that time? 
A. Of course, we did. 
Q. And can you tell me what you talked to Tom about? 
A. Well, he and Teri had discussed some things on the 
contract that she wanted changed. We made notes on the 
contract relative to those changes. AS I recall, Tom also 
'called Teri, they went over the contract -
THE COURT: Counsel, could you have him back up and 
have him start with the meeting and who's there, since we have 
had some variation as to that testimony? 
Q. (By Mr. Abbott) Okay, who was there at that meeting? 
A. Becky Mendenhall, my wife, Tom, and I. 
Q. Okay. Teri was not there? 
A. Teri was not there. 
Q. You said you went over with Teri some changes to the 
contract. How did you go over those with Teri if she wasn't 
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there at the meeting? 
A. Well, Tom called her on the phone and in our presence 
'discussed it with her. 
Q. Okay. All right. So there was some changes that she 
'wanted made to the contract? 
A. And Teri -'or Becky retyped that entire contract in| 
the office in our presence. 
Q. Okay. So Becky retyped the contract while you an$ 
Tom and Janice were waiting. Was Becky part of the 
conversation at all times or were there points when she was off 
typing the contract or doing other things? 
A. No, she was part of the conversation. 
Q. Now, did you discuss anything else with Tom? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. What else did you discuss with him? 
A. We explained to Tom all over again what a hardship 
this would be if that loan was not in place and if they cj^ uld 
not pay us back. 
Q. Okay. And what did he tell you about that? 
A. The same thing Teri did, assured us that they had Another 
loan in place, that the loan would be consunnated very shortly, 
they would have no trouble paying us back, and they would pay 
us out of that loan. 
Q. Okay. What else did you discuss at that time with iTom? 
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A. I asked him if the stallion was free and clear. He 
indicated that she was. I said, Tom, are there any 
encumbrances on this stallion at all? He said none. 1 asked 
him if it was fully paid off? He assured me it was. 
Q. Okay. What else did you discuss with Tom? 
A. I asked him' if he or Teri had individually or 
together had ever declared bankruptcy. He told me they had 
not. 
Q. Okay. Anything else you remember discussing with him? 
A. Other than the contract itself, I really can't. (T:383:10-
385:16) 
Janice Timothy testified regarding the closing as follows: 
Q. In that conversation was anything mentioned about whether 
or not they owned He's a son of a Dun, and I say "they" Tom 
and Teri owned He's a son of a Dun free and clear, or whether 
or not they had posted He's a Son of a Dun as collateral to 
another person? 
A. It was always implied that he was free and clear. There 
was never any mention of him being collateralized, or there was 
no way 1 would have signed this. (T:280:l 1-18) 
Janice further testified: 
Q. On September 28, 2001, did you discuss with Tom whether 
or not he had ever declared bankruptcy or whether he was in 
bankruptcy? 
A. No. I did not. (T:281:23-282:1) 
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Becky Mendenhall testified regarding the conversation at closing as follows: 
Q. During the day of the closing do you recall any 
conversations that occurred with regard to whether the 
Keetches had filed bankruptcy? 
A. There were no conversations as far as a bankruptcy 'being 
filed, 
Q. Was there any conversations on that day with regard to the 
creditworthiness of the Keetches? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any discussion on that day whether He's $ Son 
of a Dun had been collateralized as part of a separate lo^n? 
A. There was no discussion. 
Q. Was there any discussion whether or not He's a Soi^  of a 
Dun was owned free and clear by the Keetches? 
A. It was assumed. 
Q. No specific discussion? 
A. Not that I recallspecifically, just that the asset - these are 
the assets that would be collateralizing the Timothy's lqan. 
(T:348:13-349:6.) 
Tom Keetch testified about the same issues regarding tlje 
closing as follows: 
*tD 
Q. At the time you entered into the loan agreement with the 
Timothys that bankruptcy was pending, though correct^ 
A. Correct. 
Q. You did not disclose that to the Timothy's? 
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A. I did not, no. 
Q. You also did not disclose to the Timothys that He's a Son 
of a Dun had been collateralized? 
A. Theses were not questions asked to me by the Timothys, so 
no. I did not disclose it to them. (T:l05:22-106:5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Had the plaintiffs searched the UCC records they would have 
determined that there was a lien against He's a son of a Dun. As a matter of 
law the Plaintiffs should be bound by the notice imparted to them that was 
available had a proper search been conducted. Because Plaintiffs did not 
search the public records they can not now assert that they reasonably relied 
on their claim that the defendants represented that the horse was free and 
clear. 
The standard of proof is a clear and convincing standard which means 
that there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion. The plaintiffs themselves contradict each other and therefore 
they have not met their burden of proof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
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THE TIMOTHYS WERE IMPARTED CONSTRUCTIVE 
NOTICE OF THE LIENS AGAINST HESA SON OF A 
DUN BASED UPON THE UCC FILINGS ON RECORD 
WITH THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Utah Supreme Court in J.R. Simplot Company, et aL v. Sales 
King InternationaL et aL 17 P.3d 1100 (Utah 2000) set out the standard with 
regard to the notice that is provided by filing a UCC filing statement with the 
Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled as follows: 
I. SECURITY INTERESTS 
[*P14] Part of the underlying purpose of the UCC is to 
"simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-102(2) 
(1997); see also Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 
717 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Utah 1986) (noting that "[a] secured 
party should be able to rely on his compliance with the Code's 
requirements for perfection"); 79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions 
§ 2 (1995) (stating that the code's "general purpose is to create 
a precise guide for commercial transactions under which 
businessmen may predict with confidence the results of their 
dealings"). Furthermore, "the fundamental purpose of Article 
9[4 ] is to give notice to third persons and simplify the filing 
process." 9 Ronald A. Anderson & Lary Lawrence, Anderson 
on the Uniform Commercial [***9] Code § 401:5, at 483 
(3d ed. rev. 1999); see also Insley, 717 P.2d at 1345 ("The 
purpose and concept of notice filing would be significantly 
weakened if we held that [the party] is not bound by that 
which it would have discovered through a proper inquiry."); 
79 C.J.S. supra, § 53, at 438 (stating that purpose of filing 
includes protection of creditor "by furnishing to others 
intending to enter into a transaction with the debtor a starting 
point for investigation which will result in fair warning with 
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respect to the transaction contemplated"). As such, a party 
who has secured its interest in accordance with article 9 has 
priority, upon a debtor's default, "over 'anyone anywhere, 
anyhow' except as otherwise provided by the remaining Code 
priority rules." Insley, 717 P.2d at 1347 (quoting Continental 
r**l 105] Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 251 Ga. 412, 306 
S.E.2cl 285, 287 (Ga. 1983)j: see also Anderson & Lawrence, 
supra, § 9-312:6, at 330 (noting that conflicts of security 
interests are determined exclusively by article 9). 
If the court determines that the information contained within the UCC 
filing provides constructive notice then the Timothy's fraud claim fails in its 
entirety. The only viable fraud claim the Timothy's have is the claim that the 
Keetches represented that uHesa Son of a Dun was free and clear of all liens 
and encumbrances and could be used by the defendants as collateral for the 
loan." 
The Plaintiffs acknowledged the existence of the UCC filing and the 
associated notice of the lien in their Amended Complaint. (See ^14 R:94). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THAT THE 
TIMOTHYS WERE NOT BOUND BY THE NOTICE 
GIVEN BY THE UCC FILING BECAUSE THE 
TIMOTHYS WERE UNAWARE OF THE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE. 
26 
The Trial Court in reaching its conclusion relied upon Robinson v. 
Tripco. 21 P.3d 219 (Utah App. 2000) which was a Utah Court of Appeals 
case wherein the Court of Appeals stated. 
To determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the 
reliance 'must be considered with reference to the facts of each 
case' Condor 139 P.2 638. In general, a Plaintiff may 
justifiably rely on a positive assertions of fact without 
independent investigation. It is only where, under the 
circumstances, the facts should make it apparent to one of his 
knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered something 
which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that 
a Plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. 
The Trial Court concluded based upon the foregoing that the 
reasonable reliance prong was a "subjective" analysis of what the Timothys 
actually knew and because the Timothys were unaware of the Uniform 
Commercial Code provisions that they were not bound by the constructive 
notice nor did the Timothys have an obligation to search the UCC filings to 
determine whether there were any liens. 
The foregoing analysis should be balanced in light of other cases and 
in fact the very next paragraph in the Robinson case, the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
id (citations admitted). In addition, fraud as relates to the 
purchase of real estate may not be predicated on alleged false 
statements the truth of which could have been ascertained with 
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reasonable diligence by the party asserting their falsity" Maack 
v. Resource Design and Construction. Inc., 875 P.2d 570 577 
(Utah Ct.App. 1994). See Robinson at p. 225. 
It is not a proper excuse or defense by a part}' to say that because I was 
unaware of a statutory provision that I am not bound by its provision. Mr. 
Timothy was a sophisticated person in the area of contracts. His employment 
for much of his life was negotiating labor contracts on behalf of large 
corporations and further both Mr. and Mrs. Timothy had their real estate 
licenses which would make them aware of recording and notice details at 
least in the arena of real estate transactions. It is not a defense to a criminal 
prosecution to come before the Court and say that I was not aware that 
certain conduct was illegal and therefore I should not be prosecuted. It would 
not be proper for the Keetches to come before this Court and say that because 
they were unaware that a fraud claim was nondischargeable in bankruptcy 
that we are not bound by those statutory provisions. 
The Timothys should not be allowed to assert that because they did not 
know about the notice imparted by the UCC filings that they are not bound by 
the notice requirements. Interestingly even the Judge in rendering her 
opinion appeared to justify the Timothys defense by asserting that until this 
case she was unaware that a security interest could be obtained on a horse 
through a UCC filing. (T:561:3-7) 
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There are a number of other cases which give clarification to the 
reasonable reliance prong as follows: The Utah Supreme Court in Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Company, 915 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1996) stated: 
No matter how naive and inexperienced the Defendants 
were, they could not close their eyes and accept unquestionably 
any representations made to them. It was their duty to make 
such investigation and inquiry as reasonable care under the 
circumstances would dictate .... The one who complains of 
being injured by such a false representation cannot heedlessly 
accept as true yvhatever is told him but has the duty of 
exercising such a degree of care to protect his own interest as 
would be exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent 
person under the circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is 
precluded from holding someone else to account for the 
consequences of his own neglect. 
It is apparent from the above citation that it is not a subjective analysis 
of what the Timothys actually did or did not know but rather an objective 
analysis of what an ordinary reasonable and prudent person under the 
circumstances would have done. 
The Court of Appeals in Maack v. Resource Design and Construction. 
Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) stated: 
Although the Klas opinion focused on the issue of unilateral 
mistake, this court further determined that the defendants' 
counterclaim for fraud and misrepresentation was properly 
dismissed: 
In light of our determination that defendants' conduct did 
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not rise to the level of ordinary diligence, it follows that the 
trial court correctly dismissed defendants' counterclaim for 
fraud and misrepresentation. "Fraud as related [**17] to 
purchase of real estate may not be predicated on alleged false 
statements the truth of which could have been ascertained 
with reasonable diligence by the part\ asserting their falsih ." 
Sokolosky v. Tulsa Orthopaedic, Inc Pension Trust, 566 P 2d 
429, 431 (Okl 1977) (quoting Onstottv. Osborne, 417 P.2d 
29h 293 (Okl 1966)). Defendants could have ascertained 
with reasonable diligence the truth or falsity of Carol Klas's 
alleged misrepresentations by requesting copies of the 
appraisals, or demanding to know the basis for her 
information, or by obtaining an independent appraisal of the 
subject property prior to executing the agreement. Since the 
means of knowledge were available to defendants and since 
they failed to avail themselves of these means, they cannot 
now claim to have been deceived by the representations of the 
vendor. See Sokolosky, 566 P.2d at 431. 
829 P.2d at 141 n.9 (emphasis added). 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not included due 
diligence as an element of negligent misrepresentation, it has 
required a somewhat analagous element of "reasonable 
reliance." [**18] See Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 59 (negligent 
misrepresentation requires reasonable reliance by injured party). 
^ Therefore, in order to successfully bring an action for negligent 
misrepresentation, the Maacks must demonstrate that they at 
least took reasonable steps to ascertain the truth of Kesselring's 
representation that there was a one-year builder's warranty, or, 
worded differently, that the Maacks' reliance on Kesselring's 
statement without some further inquiry was reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
The Court implements an objective standard of what a reasonable person 
would have done under the circumstances. 
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POINT III 
AS IT RELATES TO THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION 
BY THOMAS KEETCH, THE COURT CANNOT FIND THAT 
BOTH MRS. TIMOTHY AND MR. TIMOTHY ARE 
CREDIBLE WITNESSES. 
The Utah District Court made the following Findings of Fact contained in 
paragraph 11 which reads: 
Paul and Janice Timothy also testified. There were some small 
conflicts in their testimony. None of those conflicts were material to 
the outcome of the case. The Court finds that the conflicts were 
justified in the length of time that has accrued since the events giving 
ride to this lawsuit and the Trial. Although the Timothys memories 
may have faded to some extent, they are both credible witnesses. 
The only time that Janice Timothy had contact with either of the Defendants 
was at the closing and Tom Keetch was the only Defendant that was present. Mr. 
Timothy testified that Thomas Keetch represented that Hesa Son of Dun was free 
and clear of all liens and encumbrances. 
Thomas Keetch, Rebecca Mendenhall and Mrs. Timothy all testified that in 
the meeting where the contract was signed that there was no discussion regarding a 
representation that Hesa Son of a Dun was held free and clear and there were no 
liens against the horse. 
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The difference in testimon) was not a minor discrepancy between the parties. 
Paul Timothy specifically testified that a representation was made by Tom Keetch at 
closing, that the horses were free and clear and could be used as collateral for the 
loan. Janice Timothy testified just the opposite saying that issue was never 
discussed. If the issue was never discussed, then there was no representation made 
by Thomas Keetch and consequently no misrepresentation. 
Although it was not properly pled as part of the Amended Complaint, Mr. 
Paul Timothy as a basis for fraud Mr. Timothy specifically testified that he asked if 
Tom Keetch had filed bankruptcy yet his wife Janice Timothy testified that the 
issues was never discussed with Tom Keetch at the closing. 
If the Court determined that Janice Timothy's testimony was credible and 
that the issue of collateral and bankruptcy was never discussed in the closing, then it 
would also tend to discount Mr. Timothy's testimony that in his one on one meeting 
with Terri Keetch, that maybe Terri Keetch was more credible when she represented 
that the same issues were not discussed in her meeting with Mr. Timothy. 
The Court could not find both Paul Timothy and Janice Timothy to be 
credible witnesses without somehow reconciling their testimony. Yet the Court 
determined by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Timothy's testimony 
established fraudulent representations. 
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The Utah Court of Appleals set out the standard of what is meant by a clear and 
convincing standard of proof in Nikols v. Goodman & Chesnoff, 626 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14, 206 P.3d 295 (Utah App. 2009) : 
Plaintiff claims that he successfully created a prima facie [***7] case 
that a valid purchase money resulting trust existed in his favor. This 
prima facie argument mistakes the effect of this evidence on 
Plaintiffs ultimate burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 
the existence of the purchase money resulting trust. Plaintiff cannot 
alleviate himself of his ultimate burden of proof by merely presenting 
some evidence in support of his claim. Plaintiff bears th£ 
responsibility to prove the existence of the purchase moftey resulting 
trust by clear and convincing evidence, which has been repeatedly 
described by Utah case law as evidence demonstrating "that there is 
no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion." See Norther est, 248 P. 2d at 698. 
Nikols v. Goodman & Chesnoff, 626 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 206 P.3d 295 (Utah App. 
2009). 
The sole basis for the fraud claim comes from the testimony of Paul 
Timothy. The Plaintiff Janice Timothy's own testimony contradicts that of her own 
husband. There is no other corroborating evidence. Both Defendants testified that 
the issue of liens and collateral was never raised and that the contract was 
negotiated through their broker who they believed had disclosed all of the details to 
the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs counsel made clear that they were pursuing their claims 
under an intentional fraud claim not negligent misrepresentation (See T:372:14-25) 
which requires a showing of an intent to defraud or at least reckless disregard. The 
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plaintiffs and the defendants stated that they were relying on the representation of 
the broker Becky Mendenhall that the long term financing was approved and just 
needed to be closed. The actual testimony of Paul Timothy is set out verbatim in 
the statement of fact which marshals all of the testimony in support of the courts 
findings however when one balances that testimony with the testimony of others 
particularly Plaintiffs wife it does not appear that the standard has been met "that 
there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion" as 
required in the foregoing case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants request that as a matter of law that this court finds that there was 
not reasonable reliance because the plaintiffs had constructive notice based upon the 
UCC filing that there was a lien on He's a Son of a Dun and consequently no fraud 
or in the alternative that the Plaintiffs have not met their burden by clear and 
convincing evidence and consequently their fraud claims be dismissed. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of February, 2010. 
MICHAEL K. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
